Abstract
Introduction
Recent attacks enabled by stolen authentication passwords and unencrypted keys methods (sniffed via a key-logging console program, shoulder-surfed via bad security awareness, poor key management practices, etc.) have allowed intruders to masquerade as legitimate users on high performance computing (HPC) clusters. This paper is the logical next step toward the development of a proactive alarm based on analysis of user command behavior in order to minimize damage from intrusions on high performance computing (HPC) clusters. In a masquerade compromise, there is little to warn a security administrator that an account has been compromised since the attackers can properly authenticate so the intrusion may be long-lasting, persistent (difficult to reverse), and act as a stepping stone to more serious damage beyond a single user account. With the motivation of detecting masqueraders on HPC clusters, we have been working to discriminate different types of users based on their command behavior.
Our intuition is that masqueraders act differently from legitimate HPC cluster users and the unique HPC cluster environment is constrained such that command behavior discrimination is enhanced versus enterprise environments.
Since an HPC cluster environment should only have a minimal set of sanctioned system/application software available to users for performance purposes (software focused on supporting computation), the number of executable commands should be severely restricted.
Data from security operations reports validate this claim -while modes of attack on HPC systems vary greatly they do have one common characteristic, attacks are all very different from legitimate user activity found in a HPC cluster environment. For instance, once gaining access to a purloined account, attackers will typically communicate via an Internet Relay Chat (IRC), download additional exploits via ftp or the web, and then compile these exploits and attempt their execution. While ftp and compile commands may be typical in an HPC cluster environment, the command sequence pattern is the key.
In [9] we considered several methods to mitigate the threat from masqueraders and presented results from empirical testing showing that we can accurately discriminate enterprise users from cluster users based on their command behavior provided with a reasonable amount of training data (in terms of either number of commands or time period). Specifically in [9] we showed that by using Support Vector Machines (SVM) for classification with no constraints we are able to detect masqueraders with an accuracy of 94.9%, together with a precision of 92.4% and a recall of 91.9%. Constraining the number of commands we found that as few as 10 commands provides an accuracy of 90%. Constraining time we found that as short as 20 minutes had a precision over 75% with a recall slightly lower than 80%. Examining the difference between the accuracy in number of commands versus time period reveals that the number of commands executed during time intervals varies significantly for different users. For instance, within 20 minutes, the user 'root' may execute hundreds of commands, but other users may only execute one command. Therefore where monitoring is measured by fixed time intervals, misidentification is generally higher due to a lack of observed commands for some users.
The number of commands is the metric for classification while monitoring time is the window of observation.
While this previous work based on identifying masqueraders on HPC clusters using SVM classification provides good accuracy at 90%, it is not good enough for a production HPC environment where the volume of users requires accuracy greater than 99%. Although SVM classification trains on both individual commands and patterns of command usage, it does not provide necessary information on feature sensitivity which may be useful to increase masquerade detection accuracy.
In this paper we seek to identify the features of command behaviors useful for identifying masqueraders in HPC clusters environments so SVM classification techniques can be incrementally improved. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the unique characteristics of process accounting as our data source. Section 3 provides an overview of the NVision-PA system architecture. Section 4 reports results from the use of NVision-PA on two processing accounting logs. We describe features for detecting masqueraders identified from NVision-PA statistical output. We end with conclusions and perspectives on future work in Section 5.
Background on Process Accounting
The UNIX/Linux accounting system collects information on individual/group usage of computer system resources. A system can record every process created by every user.
This kind of logging is called process accounting. An example of the need for automated process accounting is the fact that many processes have short life spans that may escape human detection with ps command monitoring but still be of such high volume to dominate system load [1] .
Process accounting has potentially high value for security purposes, for instance after a break-in to help determine what commands a user executed, correlating evidence, and incident investigation [3, 5, 7, 9] . Other examples of security-related uses include:
• To hold a use accountable for some action indicated in the logs • To enable the extraction of patterns of use of objects, users or security mechanisms in the system • To identify security policy violations • To identify unsupported or vulnerable software is being used • To create an audit trail of the use (or abuse) that may occur from a specific user.
• To prevent the users from abusing the system by acting as a deterrent, given that the users know that there is a mechanism that logs security relevant actions in the system While this work is motivated by the use of process accounting for security purposes, there are other uses for process accounting data. For example: (1) process accounting data is generally used in HPC environments to bill individual users (or groups of users) for the amount of CPU time that they consume [2, 8] and (2) process accounting data provides an accurate source for workload characterization needed to tune applications and schedulers [1, 4, 6] .
Process accounting is performed by the UNIX kernel. Every time a process terminates, the kernel writes a 32-byte record to the /var/adm/acct or /var/adm/pacct file that includes:
• name of the user and group who created the process • first eight characters of the name of the command which launched the process Process accounting data is subject to some inherent limitations with respect to security monitoring. For our purposes, we note two such limitations here. The first limitation is that process accounting does not keep track of parameters passed with the executed command. In fact, it only keeps track of the first eight characters of the command executed. Based on this, a malicious user could link a malicious tool to one with an innocent name and then execute the linked file. The second limitation it is likely that an experienced attacker will attempt to delete any traces including command traces by suspending or stopping process accounting or modifying the existing process logfile of traces. To counteract the disabling of process accounting, it is possible to reliably and securely send the command history to protected servers at regular intervals where it can be archived beyond reach of intruders up to the point when the operating system is subverted and messages cease.
Lastly, there are two biasing effects with all process accounting software that must be considered: (1) "the Heisenberg Principle" -the processing needed to observe a system will impact the system, however, process accounting counters are always operational (whether turned on or off) with the processing impact occurring in post-processing when command history is flushed to the file system for analysis and (2) "the Edge Effect" -accounting records are written only for processes that have terminated so if a program runs for a long period it will not show up in the command history until the process is done [9] . While in this paper we focus on identifying features of command behaviors useful for detecting masqueraders, in future work we plan to study both of these biasing effects: (1) determining the scalability limits of process accounting, both when does process accounting impact CPU performance and what activity level will impact process accounting performance and (2) determining how numerous and significant are "edge effect" processes. For more details about process accounting, see [2, 5, 8, 9] .
NVision-PA System Architecture
NVision-PA is available from the following URL:
<http://security.ncsa.uiuc.edu/distribution/NVision-PADownLoad.html>
where there is also documentation on the installation procedures. 
RedHat)
while the other one is found on UNIX systems (e.g. Sun OS). Our tool automatically recognizes either of these process accounting formats, parsing the data according to the recognized format. The Linux and UNIX formats differ mainly in the size of their respective fields (in bytes). Furthermore, the Linux format has additional fields (e.g. number of page faults) not found in the UNIX format. NVision-PA processes only the fields common to both formats.
NVision-PA Statistics Collector Engine
The Statistics Collection Engine is the core of NVision-PA. The collection engine parses the process accounting log file as input and produces a number of statistical reports for display through the NVision-PA GUI. When designing this engine, we had to consider two main factors: scalability and extensibility. Scalability is the primary requirement since the size of those logs can grow toward Terabytes depending on the volume usage of the system logging and the period of observation. To satisfy scalability, we generate nine different reports after only one pass through the log file. A secondary requirement is extensibility to add new reports or different statistics should new fields be added or new statistics become desirable -minimal effort should be required in order to produce a new report. The decision was made to produce NVision-PA in Java since process accounting logs can be found on many different platforms and we would like this tool to be portable for all of those platforms. For graphics we used the open source library "Chart2D" (a java library for drawing two dimensional charts by Jason J. Simas) that is available under the GNU license. 
NVision-PA Output Results
There are nine different output reports implemented in the current version NVision-PA, each is represented as a tab on the NVision-PA GUI. In this section we display and discuss results from NVision-PA for each of these nine different output reports for the case of process accounting logs from two different sources: (1) a multi-user Internet server and (2) a multi-user HPC cluster. Specifically we wish to compare how Internet server command behavior output differs from HPC cluster command behavior output for each of the nine reports. We also discuss whether these process accounting observations may be generalizable beyond these specific input data sets.
In Figure 5 we see an example of the NVision-PA "General" tab results which contains high-level information about the total number of commands, total number of distinct commands, the starting and ending date of the log, and effective logging period measured in days. The desired insight of this tab report is a general overview of the selected input processing accounting log file. In Figures 5A and 5B we see that both the Internet server and the HPC cluster processing accounting log files refer to about a month of data (31 and 28 days respectively) which is approximately equalized for comparison. We can conclude that the HPC cluster has more user interactivity over this period since it has 21 times more executed commands (1,853,411 versus 87,137). We can also conclude that the Internet server has a wider variety of the executed commands proportional to its usage since the ratio of distinct commands executed to total number of commands executed is an order of magnitude higher for the Internet server (.002) than the HPC cluster (.0004).
"Distinct commands" in this context are defined as commands that occur at least once in the log file, multiple instances of the same command are not counted -a command is either present in the log file and counted once or not present/not counted. "Total commands" in this context are defined as each command execution instance, the same command executed x times is counted x times. Figure 6 presents the NVision-PA "Users (non-distinct) Commands" tab results that refer to the distribution of total commands over all users in the selected input log. The desired insight from this tab report is the distribution of total commands 2 per user executed on the system during the period contained in the log. From this we can infer different types of referring to a specialized cluster scheduler, rsync referring to a specialized file transfer application, sleep referring to delay for a specified amount of time, and libtool for using shared libraries. Masquerader commands would not necessarily show up in the HPC cluster top 20 list since their frequency would be too low, however, automated Internet server processes (such as a mail spammer process) would be easily discernable as suspicious if they did appear. The relationship between these time components is as follows:
System Time(ac_stime) + User Time(ac_utime) <= Elapsed Time(ac_etime)
Figure 10 presents the NVision-PA "System Time/Number of Commands" tab results that refer to the distribution of system time over all commands 6 in the selected input log.
In other words, we can see how many commands had a system time of x seconds. The desired insight from this tab report is the distribution of system time per command for different environments during the period contained in the selected input log. We may expect computational science researchers in the HPC cluster environment to have processes with higher system times since higher system times may reflect simulations and other tasks that the average Internet server user would not likely execute. The percentage of commands that executed with a system time of less than 0.1 seconds is comparable between the Internet server and HPC cluster environments; 14% and 9% respectively. of user times will be skewed higher. We can see from Figure 11A that the user time of
Internet server commands peaks with 35% of all commands falling within the range 0-1 seconds with an exponential drop-off from this peak. In Figure 11B we see that the user time of HPC cluster commands does not peak but rather more closely resembles a uniform distribution with these percentages of commands: 21% (0-1sec), 21% (1-2sec), 22% (2-4sec), 16% (4-8sec), 7% (8-16sec), and 13% (>16sec). noted that the x axis in Figures 13A and 13B have different labels. In Figure 13A , the memory usage distribution for commands executed on the Internet server shows 2 peak modes: 53% (100-500 memory pages) and 32% (> 1000 memory pages) -which when combined accounts for 85% of all commands. In Figure 13B , the memory usage distribution for commands executed on the HPC cluster shows only 1 peak mode which characterizes most of the commands: 94% (2000-7000 memory pages). Comparing
Figures 13A and 13B reveals that HPC cluster users execute commands with distinctly more memory requirements than commands executed by users in an Internet server environment.
Lastly, this is the second data set of Internet server/HPC cluster process accounting logs we have analyzed, the first data set was briefly described in [9] . The results from both data sets are consistent so we believe them to be accurate characterizations of their This same procedure using NVision-PA may be used to enhance discrimination of command behaviors for any set of environments.
Summary
NVision-PA makes available sophisticated analysis of process accounting logs using a Java GUI portable to most environments. Specifically in this paper we report results from NVision-PA for comparing two process accounting data sets; one from an Internet server environment and one from an HPC cluster environment. The features revealed by NVision-PA in these data sets are an incremental but significant next step in developing a real-time masquerade detector for the HPC cluster environment based on command behavior. Beyond masquerade detection, the analysis capability of NVision-PA also promises to be useful in tuning complex system environments for workloads that can be characterized by command behaviors.
